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Abstract 
We analyze whether the possibility for physicians to dispense drugs increases health 
care expenditures due to the incentives created by the markup on drugs sold. Using 
comprehensive physician-level data from Switzerland, we exploit the fact that there 
is regional variation in the dispensing regime to estimate policy effects. The 
empirical strategy consists of doubly-robust estimation which combines inverse-
probability weighting with regression. Our main finding suggests that if dispensing 
is permitted, physicians produce significantly higher drug costs in the order of 30% 
per patient. 
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Physician Dispensing 1
1 Introduction
As many developed countries are faced with continuously rising health care costs,
knowledge on inefficiencies in health care provision is very important in shaping
reforms. One potential source of such inefficiencies are the conflicting incentives
for physicians who act both as entrepreneurs and as agents for their patients. One
important such policy, and the central issue of this paper, is the regulation of drug
dispensing by physicians. If physicians are allowed to sell drugs to patients, they
may prescribe more drugs or substitute towards more expensive prescriptions
in order to generate additional income. In other words, dispensing can create
financial incentives for physicians to induce demand and thus raise health care
expenditures. While most OECD countries fully ban physician dispensing, there
are some notable exceptions: the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and
Switzerland (partly) allow medical doctors to dispense drugs.1 Although some
recent evidence exists that the dispensing behavior of physicians is affected by
the markup on drugs (see for example Iizuka, 2007, 2012), empirical evidence
on the effects of physician dispensing on drug or health care expenditures is
scarce. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to examine empirically whether
the possibility for physicians to dispense affects prescription drug expenditure.
To our knowledge, we are the first to estimate the causal effect of physician
dispensing on health care expenditures.
Examining the Swiss case is particularly interesting for several reasons. First,
both dispensing rules (banned/allowed) co-exist in Switzerland because the rule
is determined on the cantonal (i.e. state) level. This regional variation in the
dispensing regime allows for the identification and estimation of policy effects.
Second, the variation in the dispensing policy is rooted in historical differences
1In the United States for example, physicians are allowed to dispense drugs in most states
with the exception of Massachusetts, Montana, New York, Texas, and Utah (see Rodwin and
Okamoto, 2000).
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of cantonal health care systems and therefore represents a credible source of
exogenous variation. Third, drug prices are set by federal regulators, i.e. prices
are the same throughout the country such that the comparison of drug costs is
not confounded by regional differences in price setting. Moreover, fully regulated
prices imply that the only channel through which physicians can affect drug
expenditure is through quantities or the composition of drugs prescribed. Fourth,
the coverage of mandatory health insurance is the same for the whole permanent
resident population of Switzerland such that drug expenditures are not likely to
be affected by insurance choice.2
For our empirical analysis, we study a comprehensive dataset on the pre-
scribing costs of specialized physicians delivering outpatient care in Switzerland.
Applying doubly-robust regression methods (see Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009),
our benchmark estimates suggest that physician dispensing increases drug ex-
penditures per patient by roughly 30% (CHF 75). In addition, total non-drug
expenditures increase as well by about 20% (CHF 100) per patient. These re-
sults suggest that, in the context of policy-induced health care expenditures,
drug costs and non-drug costs are complementary. This lends support to the
notion that over-prescribing raises consultation costs through an increase in the
total time of treatment. On the whole, our findings suggest that the dispensing
policy clearly affects the prescribing behavior of physicians in ways that affect
health care expenditures.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
relevant literature and Section 3 provides information on the institutional back-
ground in Switzerland. In Section 4, we discuss identification and estimation of
treatment effects in our framework. Section 5 contains the empirical analysis:
we explain the construction of the dataset, determine the sample of common
2Further details on the Swiss health care system can be found in Health Care Systems
in Transition report on Switzerland (European Observatory on Health Care Systems, 2000)
and The OECD Review of Health Systems: Switzerland (OECD/World Health Organization,
2011).
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support, present descriptive statistics, and discuss the main results (in Section
5.4). Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Related Literature
In spite of a large literature on physician behavior and demand inducement
(see, e.g, Labelle et al., 1994; McGuire, 2000), comparatively little evidence ex-
ists regarding their dispensing practice (see Lim et al., 2009, for an overview).
The most thoroughly analyzed aspect of physician behavior related to drugs is
their prescription practice in terms of generic and trade-name medicine (see,
e.g., Hellerstein, 1998; Coscelli, 2000; Lundin, 2000). However, the results in
this literature are mostly based on data from countries without physician dis-
pensing. Three exceptions are Liu et al. (2009), Rischatsch et al. (2009), and
Iizuka (2007, 2012), where the authors find for Taiwan, Switzerland and Japan,
respectively, that markup differentials between generic and trade-name drugs af-
fect physicians’ dispensing behavior. In addition, Park et al. (2005) find that
the introduction of a dispensing ban in South Korea led to a reduction in an-
tibiotic prescriptions. A similar result is found by Filippini et al. (2013) who
compare antibiotic prescriptions between dispensing and non-dispensing doctors
in Switzerland. While these results consistently suggest that physicians respond
to financial incentives, no conclusions can be drawn as to how physician dispens-
ing affects aggregate health care expenditures.
A much smaller strand of the literature focuses on the impact of physician
dispensing on health care expenditures. Chou et al. (2003) analyze the impact
of the dispensing ban that was implemented sequentially in Taiwan and find a
substantial decrease in the drug expenditures per visit. However, the effect on ag-
gregate health care expenditures remains unclear due to a simultaneous increase
in consultation fees. Baines et al. (1996) and Dummermuth (1993) find for Lin-
Physician Dispensing 4
colnshire (United Kingdom) and two Swiss cantons, respectively, that dispensing
physicians trigger more drug expenditures per patient than their non-dispensing
counterparts. However, these studies essentially compare differences in means
and do not control for compositional differences in the patient populations of
dispensing and non-dispensing physicians. In a more recent study for Switzer-
land, Beck et al. (2004) estimate the effect of the cantonal (i.e. state) dispensing
policy controlling for other determinants of drug demand. Using canton-level
data, the authors find that physician dispensing considerably increases drug ex-
penditures. However, comparisons only on the canton level are problematic due
to small sample size and unobserved canton-specific heterogeneity.
While some of the mentioned studies credibly suggest that financial incentives
affect physicians’ prescription choice (e.g. generic vs. brand-name), the ques-
tion as to how dispensing affects health care expenditures has largely remained
unanswered due to inconclusive empirical evidence. Our main contribution to
the literature is therefore to estimate causal effects of the dispensing policy rule
(allowed vs. banned) on drug as well as non-drug expenditure. Such estimates
provide direct information on the health care costs of physician dispensing and
are therefore of high relevance for health care policy. In addition, they add to
the literature on physician behavior in the presence of monetary incentives.
3 Drug Dispensing and Pricing in Switzerland
The Swiss pharmaceutical market for prescription drugs is highly regulated on
the federal level with respect to drug approval, pricing, prescribing and dispens-
ing. In principle, pharmacists are allowed to sell prescription drugs, but they
cannot issue prescriptions. Thus, only medical doctors are allowed to issue pre-
scriptions to patients. The fact that only medical doctors can prescribe is an
important institutional feature because prescribing costs of dispensing and non-
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dispensing physicians can be adequately compared. Moreover, it is unlikely that
differences in the availability of pharmacies confound our analysis as patients
must visit a physician to obtain prescription medication independent of the dis-
pensing regime.
As far as dispensing is concerned, cantons either prohibit or (partially) permit
doctors to dispense drugs.3 In the time period considered in this paper (2008–
2010), five cantons prohibit physician dispensing completely and four cantons
have policies that result in a de facto ban. Thirteen cantons allow physician
dispensing without any restrictions and four cantons partially allow it in com-
munities with low pharmacy densities (see Appendix A.1 for further details).
These canton-specific regulations did not change during the period of interest
and had been in place since at least the 1980s. Thus, the observed variation in
the dispensing regime is rooted in historical differences between cantonal health
care policies.
It is important to note that, while German-speaking cantons have some vari-
ation in the dispensing rule, all cantons in the French and Italian speaking parts
of Switzerland ban physician dispensing. This means that we cannot control for
language region in the estimation procedures. As a consequence, we restrict our
analysis to the German-speaking area given the ample evidence of culture-specific
differences in health care consumption and expenditures (see, e.g., Vatter and
Ruefli, 2003; Crivelli et al., 2006; Reich et al., 2012). In other words, the analysis
based on the whole of Switzerland would not allow for the identification of policy
effects because it would be confounded with unobserved cultural effects.
An important fact about the Swiss drug market is that ex-factory prices
as well as retail prices of all drugs covered by mandatory health insurance are
determined by federal regulations. The price of pharmaceuticals charged by a
dispensing physician corresponds to the retail price plus 2 .5% VAT, such that his
3Switzerland has 26 cantons.
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gross profit margin corresponds to the difference between the retail price and the
ex-factory price. For example, for a drug with an ex-factory price of CHF 100,
the physician charges the patient CHF 128, thus earning a markup of CHF 28
per package (see Appendix A.2). A crucial feature is that the absolute markup
is increasing in the ex-factory price.
In addition, pharmacies charge higher prices than physicians due to two addi-
tional lump-sum fees. Given this price setting regime, the pharmacist earns an ex-
cess markup compared to the physician (see Appendix A.2 for further details). To
appropriately compare the costs between dispensing and non-dispensing physi-
cians, our analysis focuses on real expenditures, which means that all drug costs
are based on retail prices excluding the pharmacists’ excess markup.4 The reason
is that the effect of dispensing on real costs is more informative about physician
behavior in the face of monetary incentives.
4 Methodology
4.1 Identification of Treatment Effects
To estimate the effect of the dispensing policy on drug expenditures, we use
the potential-outcomes framework which has become standard in causal analysis
(Rubin, 1974). Consider a large population of physicians indexed by i = 1, 2, ...N .
Let Di be an indicator variable with Di = 1 if physician i is allowed to dispense
drugs directly and Di = 0 if physician i is forbidden to do so. We regard the
permission to dispense as the “treatment” and thus refer to the two groups as
treatment group and control group, respectively. Denote Y1i and Y0i the potential
expenditures that physician i triggers if he is either dispensing or non-dispensing,
respectively. Since we only observe Y1i if Di = 1 and Y0i if Di = 0, the realized
4The term “real” refers to constant prices in the cross-section dimension. However, we also
adjust costs across different years for inflation, such that “real” also applies to the time-series
dimension. We explain how we adjust for pharmacy prices in the Appendix C.
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outcome may be written as Yi = DiY1i + (1−Di)Y0i.
The quantity of interest is the average causal effect of dispensing on drug
expenditures in the physician population
τ = E[Y1i − Y0i], (1)
commonly known as the population average treatment effect (ATE). This effect
is informative about the average costs associated with the policy that admits
dispensation for all physicians relative to the policy that bans dispensation for
all physicians. Moreover, it is instructive to consider the average effect for the
group of dispensing physicians:
ρ = E[Y1i − Y0i|Di = 1]. (2)
This quantity is referred to as the population average treatment effect on the
treated (ATT). This effect is informative about the cost consequences of the
current policy relative to the policy that bans dispensation for all physicians.
Obtaining consistent estimates of the objects in (1) and (2) is the main goal of
the empirical analysis in this paper.
The main issue with treatment effects is to ensure identification. Let Xi
denote a vector of covariates capturing characteristics of physician i and his
patients as well as various supply and demand conditions at physician i’s location
(e.g. physician density, health status and insurance coverage, demographic and
socio-economic factors). A prominent result from the causal inference literature
states that (1) and (2) are identified under the following assumptions (cf. Imbens,
2004):
(Yi0, Yi1) ⊥ Di|Xi = x (3)
0 < p(x) < 1 ∀x ∈ X , (4)
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where p(x) ≡ P (Di = 1|Xi = x) is the propensity score and X ⊂ Rk is the
support of Xi. The conditional independence assumption in (3) states that once
we control for the characteristics in Xi, treatment status is as good as randomly
assigned and thus independent of potential outcomes. Put differently, compar-
ing observations with the same covariate values, any systematic difference in
outcomes across treatment and control group is due to the dispensing policy Di.
Although (3) is intestable, we argue that our setting renders (3) likely to be
satisfied. First, our empirical framework has the advantage that the dispensing
policy is determined by institutions on the regional level, such that the possi-
bility for physicians to influence their treatment group assignment is strongly
restricted. Second, differences in dispensing policies are historical (see Section
3), which eliminates concerns that observed policy rules are endogenous. Third,
other institutional features such as drug prices and health insurance regulations
are the same throughout the country and are therefore guaranteed not to con-
found the analysis.5 Fourth, we can mitigate concerns that physicians select
into treatment groups based on unobservables by controlling for personal char-
acteristics of physicians. This eliminates any potential bias that arises if these
characteristics affect prescribing behavior and treatment assignment. Finally, as
shown in the empirical analysis, we can effectively control for health care market
conditions in the practice location. This ascertains that only dispensing and non-
dispensing doctors are compared that face similar supply and demand conditions
in the local health care market.
The common support assumption in (4) implies that, for all possible values
of Xi, we can match dispensing doctors with non-dispensing doctors. This as-
sumption is testable and we will show in the empirical analysis how the sample
is restricted to the common support if (4) is violated for a subset of the obser-
vations.
5However, it is conceivable that patients’ deductible choices vary across regions, which is
why we control for these potential differences.
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As shown for example in Imbens (2004), assumptions (3) and (4) imply that
the ATT and the ATE are identified as follows:
ρ = E[Δ(x)|Di = 1] (5)
τ = E[Δ(x)] (6)
where Δ(x) ≡ E[Yi|Xi = x,Di = 1] − E[Yi|Xi = x,Di = 0]. Given this iden-
tification result, the remaining task is to estimate the conditional expectation
functions with appropriate econometric techniques.
4.2 Estimation
There are several empirical strategies available for estimating treatment effects
under assumptions (3) and (4). We choose to focus on a method that combines
regression with propensity score weighting, also referred to as “doubly robust”
regression. The doubly robustness property is particularly appealing because,
as discussed below, the estimator is consistent under two separate sets of as-
sumptions (Robins et al., 2007). Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) recommend this
approach explicitly because it is found to perform especially well if covariate
distributions differ substantially across groups.6
Estimation proceeds in several steps. First, the propensity score is estimated
with a binary probability model. The predicted values, pˆ(Xi), are then used to
compute inverse-probability weights (IPW): λˆρ(Xi) =
(
Di +
pˆ(Xi)
1−pˆ(Xi)(1−Di)
)
for
the ATT and λˆτ (Xi) =
(
Di
pˆ(Xi)
− 1−Di
1−pˆ(Xi)
)
for the ATE. For the second step, define
the parametric regression models for the treatment group and the control group
by m(Xi, β
1) and m(Xi, β
0), respectively. The doubly robust regression estimator
6Note that we do not consider matching methods because we have clusters of repeated
observations. Unfortunately, for matching estimators, the bootstrap is generally not valid
(Abadie and Imbens, 2008) and analytical variances of matching estimators are difficult to
compute for the case of clustered data. In addition to the clustering problem, matching on
covariates has the disadvantage that the asymptotic bias increases in the number of continuous
covariates (Imbens, 2004).
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βˆd,e is obtained by solving the following IPW-augmented moment conditions:
Nd∑
i:Di=d
λˆe(Xi)[Yi −m(Xi, βˆd,e)]Xi = 0, for di = {0, 1}, e = {ρ, τ} (7)
Finally, the estimated coefficients are used to estimate the ATT and the ATE,
respectively, as follows:
ρˆ =
1
N1
N1∑
i:Di=1
m(Xi, βˆ
1,ρ)−m(Xi, βˆ0,ρ) (8)
τˆ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
m(Xi, βˆ
1,τ )−m(Xi, βˆ0,τ ) (9)
Using the appropriate propensity-score weights λˆe(Xi) in the regressions ensures
that treatment effects are consistently estimated under two separate sets of as-
sumptions. That is, consistency is achieved if either the outcome model is cor-
rectly specified (in which case plim(βˆd,e) = βd), or the propensity score model
is correctly specified (in which case plim(λˆe(Xi)) = λ
e(Xi)), or both. See for
example Robins et al. (2007) or Wooldridge (2007) for the formal derivation and
a detailed discussion of the doubly robustness result. The main advantage of
this type of estimator is that it guards against misspecification more effectively
than traditional methods based on the propensity score alone or on regression
alone. In practice, the outcome model is normally specified as a linear model
such that (7) becomes a weighted least squares (WLS) estimator. If the outcome
model is assumed to be exponential, (7) is the weighted Poisson quasi-maximum-
likelihood estimator (WPQML), see Wooldridge (2007).7 We will consider both
of these specifications in our analysis. Finally, inference is based on the block
bootstrap, which takes into account two things: first, the potential serial cor-
relations within panels (i.e. physicians), and second, the uncertainty from the
7This estimator is equivalent to the generalized linear model (GLM) with log-link and
Poisson family augmented with the appropriate weights.
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first-step estimation of the propensity score.
5 Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis is structured in the following manner. We first describe
the construction of the dataset from the various sources we draw on. Second, we
determine the common support of the covariate distributions. Third, we briefly
present descriptive statistics on outcomes and covariates in the common support
sample. Finally, we estimate and discuss the effect of the dispensing policy on
health care expenditure.
5.1 Data Sources and Variables
We have access to physician-level data for the period 2008-2010 provided by
the operator of the nationwide database of Swiss health insurers (Sasis AG). We
have expenditure data on medical specialists delivering outpatient care in private
practices. Primary care physicians (general practitioners) are not included. The
dataset basically aggregates the mandatory health insurance claims of nearly
all Swiss health insurance companies.8 The included insurance companies cover
about 90% of the permanent resident population of Switzerland. Although we
do not have individual prescription items as the unit of observation, we estimate
that the data aggregates about 30 million prescriptions annually.9 This com-
prehensiveness strengthens the external validity of our analysis because issues of
adverse selection into individual insurance firms are not of concern. Two points
about the data on prescription drug expenditures should be added. First, as is
mostly the case with insurance claims data, out-of-pocket expenditure that pa-
tients do not report to their insurer is not included. This is most likely relevant
8Three out of 61 insurance companies are not included; these are Assura, EGK and SLKK.
9This estimate is based on detailed insurance claims data from one major health insurer
with more than half a million customers. The estimate is based on the assumption that the
average number of prescriptions per person is the same for the remaining population.
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for patients who only incur small amounts of health care costs in a given year
and are therefore unlikely to exceed the deductible.10 Second, although the vast
majority of drugs covered by mandatory health insurance require prescriptions,
there are some exceptions; roughly 8% are over-the-counter (OTC) products. 11
In the ensuing discussion on the construction of the dataset, the reader is
referred to Table B.I in Appendix B for a detailed exposition of all variables.
For each physician, the data contains two separate components of total annual
prescribing costs triggered. First, we observe direct costs (dispensing costs)
which arise when a doctor directly sells drugs to his patients. Second, we ob-
serve indirect costs which arise when a doctor issues prescriptions that are
filled in pharmacies. In other words, the cost for every prescription drug sold
in pharmacies can be attributed to the physician who originally issued the pre-
scription. This feature of the data is of paramount importance; without it, we
would not be able to appropriately compare expenditures between dispensing
and non-dispensing physicians. Besides drug expenditures, we also observe non-
drug medical costs, the number of patients, the patients’ average age, and the
distribution of office visits across age groups (5-year intervals) and gender. 12
A further advantage of the data is that every physician can be identified
through his global identifier number (GLN). The GLN can be used to match
the expenditure data to individual characteristics of physicians taken from the
register of medical professionals (MedReg).13 Variables include gender, nation-
ality, age and experience. The MedReg database also includes information on
the treatment indicator, Di, i.e. the dispensing permission (cf. Table B.I in
Appendix B).
Since the dispensing policy varies by region, we want to account for the fact
10Based on national accounting data on the consumption of pharmaceuticals, we estimate
that our data contains at least 84% of the relevant drug expenditures.
11These include for example painkillers with low dosage or certain herbal products.
12Note that the data does not contain information on individual patients.
13see http://www.bag.admin.ch/themen/berufe/00411/
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that physicians face different demand and supply conditions depending on the
local health care market in which they operate. To do this, we exploit the fact
that, for each physician, we observe the distribution of office visits across pa-
tients’ place of residence (municipality). Since we have this detailed knowledge
on a physician’s catchment area, we can effectively control for location-specific
determinants of the health care market. On the supply side, we take into ac-
count the local physician density. On the demand side, we control for the health
status and insurance choice of the local population and for demographic and
socio-economic characteristics that are relevant for consumption of prescription
drugs. The latter include, for example, the degree of urbanization, average in-
come, unemployment, immigration and education level. For each physician, we
average all these variables across municipalities using the number of visits from
these municipalities as a weight. Since a physician may draw patients from a
much larger area than from the municipality he works in, the weighted averages
effectively capture the characteristics of the location-specific health care market
that are relevant for a particular physician.
In the empirical analysis, we consider medical specialists but exclude psychi-
atrists because the nature of their health care provision, the forms of treatment,
and the role of medication are quite different compared to other specialized physi-
cians. Furthermore, we only consider physicians reporting at least 10 patients
per year (5% of sample are excluded).14 Finally, after combining the datasets
and applying the selection criteria outlined above, we are left a vast major-
ity (roughly 90%) of all specialized physicians running independent practices in
German-speaking Switzerland.
14Many of these doctors with less than 10 patients only report a single patient. According to
Sasis AG, these are likely to be physicians who have retired or quit working for other reasons,
but who are still allowed to prescribe drugs to themselves and/or family member and then file
these insurance claims to their health insurer.
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5.2 Determining Common Support
Since treatment effects (policy effects) can only be estimated for the common
support, a prior analysis of the overlap of covariate distributions between treat-
ment and control groups is of great importance. A useful starting point is to
inspect scale-free normalized differences (instead of t-statistics), which indicate
how difficult it is to adjust for differences in covariates when estimating policy
effects.15 Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) state that, as a rule of thumb, normal-
ized differences exceeding 0.25 in absolute value should invoke caution when using
simple regression methods. Table I shows that for some covariates, normalized
differences clearly exceed one quarter in absolute value such as for the number
of patients, the physician density, and several of the socio-economic variables.
– Insert Table I about here –
These findings suggest that appropriately adjusting for differences in covari-
ates might be difficult when estimating policy effects, and moreover, attention
must be paid to missing overlap in the covariate distributions. To proceed fur-
ther, we estimate the propensity score with a logit model to investigate the
group-specific densities of the propensity score values, see Figure 1.
– Insert Figure 1 about here –
As we can see from the high probability mass at the boundaries of the [0 , 1] in-
terval in Figure 1 (a), there are a fair number of observations for which treatment
status is almost perfectly predicted. That is, these observations are in areas of
the covariate space where there are no units of the opposite group and therefore
lie outside the common support. To restrict the sample to the common support,
we follow the approach recently proposed by Crump et al. (2009). Compared to
other methods where researchers have to choose trimming parameters in an ad
15The normalized difference of covariate j is computed as (xˉj1− xˉj0)/
√
Vˆj1 + Vˆj0, where xˉjd
and Vˆjd are the sample mean and the sample variance, respectively, estimated in the subsample
with Di = d ∈ {0, 1}. Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) argue that t-statistics are not useful in
this context because the problem of differences in covariates is invariant to sample size.
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hoc fashion (cf. Smith and Todd, 2005), this method has the advantage that it is
purely data-driven and straightforward to implement because it is solely based
on the marginal distribution of the propensity score. The aim is to compute the
cut-off parameter α that solves the minimization problem derived in Crump et
al. (2009, p. 193) and then to restrict the sample to those observations satisfying
pˆ(x) ∈ [αˆ, 1 − αˆ]. Using their algorithm, we find αˆ = 0.099 and consequently
about 14% of the sample are dropped. Given the common-support sample, the
propensity score model is then re-estimated (cf. Crump et al., 2009). For detailed
results of the propensity score estimation, the reader is referred to Appendix C.
The effect of this procedure is illustrated in two ways. First, the re-estimated
propensity score should no longer include values close to zero and one. Indeed,
Figure 1 (b) shows that the probability mass close to the boundaries is prac-
tically reduced to zero such that the common support assumption now seems
likely to be satisfied. Second, the covariate distributions of the treatment and
the control group become more balanced as can be seen from normalized differ-
ences calculated in the common-support sample in Table I. Comparing values,
we see that, as expected, the magnitude of normalized differences becomes siz-
ably smaller (and thus covariate distributions more balanced) when moving from
the full sample to the common-support sample. Importantly, the largest values
in the full sample (e.g. population density, physician density, share of urban
area, unemployment rate), drop markedly by about 25 to 50%. Overall, this
means that adjusting for differences in covariates will be much less critical when
estimating treatment effects. Finally, it bears emphasizing the restriction to the
common support means that we can identify and estimate policy effect only for
a subset of the population. In our case, however, the common support sample
represent a large majority of the initial sample (86%).
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5.3 Descriptive Statistics
Tables II presents descriptive statistics. The dataset includes 1,908 non-dispensing
doctors and 1,416 dispensing doctors. In total, this amounts to a panel of 9,228
observation because most individuals are observed during all three years (2008–
2010). Expenditure variables are annual measures expressed in constant 2010
Swiss francs (CHF) and averaged across the sample period. As explained previ-
ously, we focus on real expenditures (in the cross-section sense), i.e. all costs are
expressed in retail prices, to facilitate comparability. We focus on expenditure
measures in per-patient terms to take into account that the average practice size
between the two groups differs, i.e. dispensing physicians have more patients on
average. For these reasons, it makes sense to consider expenditures per patient.16
Table II reveals that dispensing physicians have higher drug expenditures per
patient compared to their non-dispensing counterparts. The same is true for
non-drug health care expenditures. Moreover, it is important to note that the
shares of dispensing costs in total drug costs are neither zero nor one. This re-
flects the fact that non-dispensing physicians are normally allowed to dispense
limited amounts of drugs in cases of emergencies. Conversely, dispensing physi-
cians may have a limited range of pharmaceuticals in stock such that patients
must collect unavailable products at pharmacies.
– Insert Table II about here –
Turning to the covariates, we see that in areas with dispensing, physicians are
more often foreign and somewhat younger. In addition, the average gender mix in
the patient pool is almost identical across groups but dispensing physicians have
somewhat younger patients. Regions where dispensing is allowed have smaller
physician density, are less urbanized, exhibit smaller shares of immigrants, and
the local population are on average less unemployed. Overall, these differences
16We do not consider costs per visit because the number of visits in a calendar year could be
directly affected by the physician’s behavior with regard to the inducement of follow-up visits.
In contrast, the number of patients should not be affected by physician behavior.
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are rather small and the covariates seem to be quite well-balanced across dis-
pensing and non-dispensing physicians.
5.4 Policy Effects of Dispensing
We now proceed to estimate the effect of the dispensing policy on the health
care expenditures triggered by physicians. As mentioned, we use expenditures
per patient as dependent variables to reduce the variation induced by differences
in practice size. Note further that we do not take logarithms because it changes
the interpretation of average policy effects in an undesired way.17 The set of
covariates used in the doubly robust regression methods is essentially the same
as the one presented in Table I, but without the number of patients (because we
consider per-patient outcomes). Due to the fairly large number of covariates, only
main effects are included in the specification.18 Because the estimation sample
pools data from several years (2008−2010), we include year-specific intercepts to
account for aggregate changes in group-specific average outcomes across years.
Standard errors are obtained by 1,000 bootstrap iterations, taking into account
the clusters of repeated observations across years and the first-step estimation
of the propensity score. When assessing the two different specifications of the
outcome model, we have to rely on appropriate goodness-of-fit measures because
the linear and exponential models are non-nested. Applying the Bayesian Infor-
mation Criterion (BIC), the exponential model is found to fit the data better,
which implies that the WPQML is preferable relative to the WLS.19 For detailed
17When outcomes are in logs, treatment effects measure the approximate percentage dif-
ference in geometric means, and not in arithmetic means. From a policy perspective, the
geometric-mean interpretation is not meaningful at all.
18We also tested extended specifications including higher-order terms. While the qualitative
results did not change, estimates were found to be less precise.
19The BIC is defined as ln( SSRN ) +
k ln(N)
N . For drugs per patient, for instance, estimation
of the outcome model in the two subsamples (Di = 0; Di = 1) produce BICs of (12.55; 12.41)
in the exponential specification and (12.61; 13.06) in the linear specification. Since the the
former has smaller values in both subsamples, the WPQML estimator is preferred to the WLS
estimator.
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estimation results, the reader is referred to Appendix C.
The main results are presented in Table III. We start by discussing the effect
of dispensing on physicians’ drug costs displayed on the left-hand side. First, the
estimated policy effects imply that dispensing raises a physician’s total annual
drug expenditure in per-patient terms by roughly CHF 75 (30%) in the popu-
lation of dispensing physicians (ATT). The estimates from WLS and WPQML
are very similar in terms of magnitude. In the overall physician population
(ATE), effects are larger and differ somewhat between estimators. (Note that
the WPQML estimate is more precise.) These results lend support to the hy-
pothesis that physicians prescribe larger amounts or more expensive drugs when
allowed to dispense. Next, it is interesting to note that all estimated policy effects
are larger than the observed difference in means which corresponds to a negative
selection effect (selection effect = unadjusted difference − ATT). That is, if we
were to estimate the policy effect naively by the raw difference in means, we
would underestimate the true effect of dispensing. Put differently, the interpre-
tation of the negative selection effect is that regions with dispensing would have
lower average costs in the absence of dispensing than regions where dispensing is
banned under the current regime. The normalized differences (Table I) suggest
that health care market conditions are likely to be the most relevant “drivers”
of the selection effect. This indicates that controlling for differences in covari-
ates is crucial in the estimation of the policy effects. Furthermore, there is some
discrepancy in the relative magnitude of the ATE and the ATT which is an indi-
cation for treatment effect heterogeneity among dispensing and non-dispensing
physicians. On the whole, the findings discussed so far suggest that physicians
respond quite strongly to the financial incentives created by the markup they
earn when dispensing prescription drugs. In this sense, our results are in line
with Liu et al. (2009), Rischatsch et al. (2009), and Iizuka (2007, 2012), who
find that the prescription choices of dispensing physicians are influenced by the
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markup (see Section 2).
– Insert Table III about here –
Besides drug costs, we also examine whether dispensing affects non-drug med-
ical expenditure, as presented on the right-hand side of Table III. We find that
dispensing also increases non-drug costs by around 20-25%. All estimates are
significant on the 1% level and very similar across the two estimators. These re-
sults point to a complementary relationship between drug expenditure and other
forms of medical expenditure in the context of policy-induced health care expen-
ditures. (In our extended analysis, we find that dispensing does not significantly
affect the cost share of drug expenditures, see the left-hand side of Table IV. This
is the same as saying that the relative effect on drug costs is not significantly
different from the relative effect on non-drug costs.) There are two explanations
for this complementarity. First and more likely, prescribing additional medi-
cation is likely to increase the total time of treatment. This may come about
because physicians must spend additional time entering the prescription infor-
mation into the patient’s record, fetching the drug from storage, informing the
patient on recommended intake and potential side effects, answering questions
the patient might have about the prescribed medication, and adding the pre-
scription to the patient’s invoice. This automatically results in higher non-drug
costs because consultation costs are increasing in consultation time. Second, a
dispensing physician may be tempted to perform additional tests or examinations
he would not otherwise perform in order to “justify” the dispensing of additional
prescription drugs to the patient. While this represents a rather severe form of
malpractice, we consider this second explanation to be less likely than the first
explanation.
– Insert Table IV about here –
To explore these issues somewhat further, we test whether the reported in-
crease in non-drug expenditure may be due to the possibility that dispensing
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physicians induce more visits than non-dispensing physicians, ceteris paribus.
The results on the right-hand side in Table IV suggest that the dispensing status
does not significantly affect the number of visits per patient. Thus, we can ex-
clude the possibility that the positive effect on non-drug expenditures reported in
Table III comes about by a stronger inducement of follow-up visits. This implies
that dispensing leads to more medical services per visit, which lends support to
the arguments presented above that dispensing increases non-drug costs through
an increase in consultation costs.
6 Conclusions
When physicians can earn a markup on dispensing prescription medication, they
have financial incentives to over-prescribe or administer more expensive treat-
ment combinations. This paper has empirically tested whether the dispensing
policy affects outpatient health care costs. Using comprehensive insurance-claims
data from Switzerland, we estimate policy effects by exploiting the fact that there
is regional variation in the dispensing policy. We employ estimation procedures
that combine inverse probability weighting and regression, which are more ro-
bust to misspecification than methods based on regression alone or the propensity
score alone.
Our benchmark estimates suggest that the dispensing permission increases
drug expenditures considerably. On top, dispensing is also found to raise non-
drug medical costs, which points to a complementary relationship between drug
and non-drug costs in the context of policy-induced demand. These findings
are of high relevance for health care policy because they imply that outpatient
health care expenditure can be reduced considerably by completely separating
the prescribing and dispensing of prescription medication.
There are some limitations to our analysis. In particular, our dataset does not
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include out-of-pocket expenditure where over-prescribing could also be relevant.
Furthermore, the data does not allow us to investigate how health outcomes
are affected by dispensing. These issues could be tackled if more detailed data
were available. Nevertheless, our study presents clear evidence that the dispens-
ing permission affects the prescribing behavior of physicians in ways that have
important implications for health care policy.
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Appendix
A Drug Dispensing and Pricing in Switzerland
A.1 Physician Dispensing (2000 − 2010)
Switzerland consists of 26 cantons (states). As Table A.I shows, 18 cantons
have “pure” policies, i.e. physician dispensing is either completely allowed or
prohibited. However, four cantons have policies that result in a de facto ban.
For example, the canton of Aargau applies a distance-to-pharmacy criterion, i.e.
if the nearest pharmacy from the physician’s office cannot be reached within one
hour by public transport, the physician is allowed to dispense. This regulation
leads to an almost complete ban of physician dispensing.
– Insert Table A.I about here –
In the four cantons with a mixed system, the dispensing rule is determined on
the municipal level. In the cantons Bern and Graubu¨nden, physician dispensing
is banned in communities where the (emergency) supply and accessibility of drugs
is sufficiently guaranteed by pharmacies. Concretely, at least one pharmacy with
all-day emergency supply has to be available in municipalities of the canton of
Graubu¨nden and in the canton of Bern at least two pharmacies are required.
Otherwise, physicians are allowed to dispense drugs without restrictions. As a
result, physicians in these two cantons are mainly allowed to dispense drugs in
rural areas. Finally, physician dispensing is not allowed in the two largest cities
of the canton of Zu¨rich (Zu¨rich and Winterthur) and the canton of Schaffhausen
(Schaffhausen and Neuhausen), respectively, while it is allowed in all other mu-
nicipalities.20
20Recently, the cantons Zu¨rich (ZH) and Schaffhausen (SH) changed the regulations. After
a ballot in the canton of Zu¨rich in 2008, where 53.7% of the cantonal electorate voted for
physician dispensing, physicians in Zu¨rich and Winterthur are allowed to dispense drugs as
of May 2012. Similarly, physician dispensing will be completely allowed in the canton of
Schaffhausen after a ballot in 2012 that concluded with 71.5% yes votes.
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A.2 Drug Price Regulations
The retail prices of all drugs that are covered by the mandatory health insurance
are determined by government regulations. The retail price consists of the ex-
factory price21 plus two additional distribution fees that are charged to cover the
cost of the retailer, e.g. shipping or warehousing costs. Since the distribution
fees increase with the ex-factory price, the absolute markup for the physician
(and the pharmacist) is increasing in the ex-factory price (see Table A.II).
– Insert Table A.II about here –
The price of pharmaceuticals charged by dispensing physicians corresponds
to the retail price plus 2.5% VAT. However, the price charged by pharmacies
is higher due to two additional lump-sum fees. First, the pharmacist receives
CHF 4.20 for checking the prescription. This fee is charged only once per drug
and prescription. Second, the pharmacist maintains records about patients’ drug
consumption and checks for potential adverse interactions with other drugs. This
fee (CHF 1.89) is charged each time the patient buys at least one package. Given
this particular price setting regime, the pharmacists earn an excess markup com-
pared to the physician.
B Variable Definitions and Construction
– Insert Table B.I about here –
C Online Appendix
Supplementary information and tables to this paper can be found on the home-
page of the corresponding author: http://staff.vwi.unibe.ch/schmid/downloads/
pd_wp_jan14.pdf
21The ex-factory price is set by the federal government and depends on prices of drugs with
the same drug action and on drug prices in other European countries with similar pharmaceu-
tical sectors (Austria, France, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Kernel Densities of Estimated Propensity Scores
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Table I: Normalized Differences of Covariates Means (2008–
2010)
full sample c.s. sample
physician characteristics
female -0.018 0.002
German nationality 0.073 0.062
other foreign nationality -0.046 -0.026
age -0.147 -0.103
work experience -0.124 -0.089
patient pool variables
# patients -0.269 -0.243
# visits per patient 0.157 0.126
patients’ average age -0.172 -0.113
cases aged > 80y -0.107 -0.042
cases aged 66− 80y -0.111 -0.070
cases aged < 25y 0.171 0.128
cases of males -0.004 0.002
characteristics of the local health care market
physician density -0.362 -0.261
share with very good subj. health 0.276 0.201
share with good subj. health -0.070 -0.044
share with very good obj. health 0.211 0.194
share with good obj. health 0.109 0.058
share with chronic health problems -0.209 -0.130
share with high health risk -0.402 -0.334
share of immigrants -0.108 -0.049
fraction of urban area -0.381 -0.266
Continued on next page
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Table I – Continued from previous page
full sample c.s. sample
net income per capita 0.095 -0.025
unemployment rate -0.309 -0.179
share of medium educated 0.201 0.160
share of high educated -0.269 -0.243
population density -0.340 -0.245
share with special managed-care plan -0.078 0.014
share with supplementary insurance 0.254 0.158
share with high deductible 0.029 0.002
speciality type
gynecologist 0.006 -0.014
angiologist -0.013 -0.021
cardiologist -0.061 -0.032
invasive specialist 0.018 0.006
other type of specialist 0.119 0.127
αˆ 0.099
# control obs. (non-dispensing) 6162 5339
# treated obs. (dispensing) 4544 3889
# control individuals (non-dispensing) 2215 1908
# treated individuals (dispensing) 1658 1416
Notes : common support refers to the subsample where observations outside
the interval [αˆ, 1 − αˆ] have been dropped. The raw normalized difference of
covariate j is computed as (xˉj1 − xˉj0)/
√
Vˆj1 + Vˆj0, where xˉjd and Vˆjd are the
mean and the variance, respectively, estimated in the subsample with Di = d ∈
{0, 1}.
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Table II: Descriptive Statistics (2008–2010)
non-dispensing dispensing
Di = 0 Di = 1
mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
real annual expenditure per physician
cost share of drugs 0.228 0.189 0.208 0.180
drug costs per patient 192.797 563.658 248.824 768.969
non-drug costs per patient 379.584 311.369 468.126 663.169
share of dispensed drugs 0.193 0.155 0.866 0.217
physician characteristics
female 0.221 0.222
German nationality 0.084 0.110
other foreign nationality 0.015 0.011
age 52.402 8.489 51.191 8.147
work experience 17.830 8.321 16.815 7.856
patient pool variables
# patients 940.438 795.079 1091.844 905.011
# visits 2162.634 1878.317 2510.100 2015.847
# visits per patient 2.541 1.988 2.534 1.600
patients’ average age 53.237 8.846 51.821 8.850
cases aged > 80y 0.074 0.069 0.070 0.063
cases aged 66− 80y 0.251 0.135 0.238 0.131
cases aged < 25y 0.094 0.103 0.114 0.110
cases of males 0.352 0.217 0.353 0.212
characteristics of the local health care market
physician density 3.449 1.092 3.033 1.162
share with very good subj. health 0.207 0.028 0.216 0.034
share with good subj. health 0.674 0.027 0.672 0.036
share with very good obj. health 0.314 0.030 0.324 0.041
share with good obj. health 0.351 0.024 0.353 0.035
share with chronic health problems 0.499 0.036 0.492 0.046
share with high health risk 0.270 0.026 0.256 0.036
share of immigrants 0.208 0.053 0.205 0.045
fraction of urban area 0.325 0.139 0.278 0.103
net income per capita 80.210 11.154 79.774 13.496
unemployment rate 2.685 0.505 2.560 0.484
share of medium educated 0.509 0.032 0.515 0.023
share of high educated 0.225 0.042 0.211 0.042
population density 0.269 0.715 0.034 0.641
share with managed-care plan 0.172 0.037 0.173 0.055
share with supplementary insurance 0.556 0.038 0.565 0.043
share with high deductible 0.425 0.046 0.425 0.042
# observations 5,339 3,889
Notes: Based on the common support sample of physicians in German-speaking
Switzerland and averaged across the period 2008-2010. All variables are measured
annually on the physician level. Costs are in 2010 Swiss francs and measured in retail
prices as charged at the doctor’s office.
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Table III: Policy Effects of Dispensing, 2008–2010
Drug Costs per Patient Non-drug Costs per Patient
% of % of
Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean
Unadjusted Difference 56.03** (23.03) 25.89% 88.54** (18.98) 21.24%
Average Treatment Effect (ATE)
WLS 138.83** (29.74) 64.15% 106.99** (13.73) 25.66%
WPQML 96.04** (21.67) 44.38% 105.62** (12.80) 25.34%
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)
WLS 76.48** (25.69) 30.74% 98.82** (17.08) 21.11%
WPQML 71.87* (32.04) 28.88% 97.67** (16.78) 20.87%
Notes : The estimation sample consists of all physicians in the years 2008-2010 that lie in the
common support. Outcomes are measured annually on the physician level. The set of covariates
used is the one presented in Table I including year-specific intercepts. Standard errors are
bootstrapped and clustered at the physician level using 1000 replications. Significance levels:
** p<0.01 and * p<0.05.
Table IV: Policy Effects of Dispensing, 2008–2010
Share of Drug Costs Visits per Patient
% of % of
Coef. S.E. mean Coef. S.E. mean
Unadjusted Difference -0.020** (0.006) -9.25% -0.007 (0.059) -0.28%
Average Treatment Effect (ATE)
WLS 0.004 (0.006) 1.89% 0.050 (0.031) 1.95%
WPQML 0.001 (0.006) 0.63% 0.049 (0.030) 1.95%
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)
WLS 0.005 (0.006) 2.63% 0.003 (0.067) 0.13%
WPQML 0.003 (0.006) 1.62% -0.003 (0.059) -0.14%
Notes : The estimation sample consists of all physicians in the years 2008-2010 that
lie in the common support. Outcomes are measured annually on the physician level.
The set of covariates used is the one presented in Table I including year-specific inter-
cepts. Standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered at the physician level using 1000
replications. Significance levels: ** p<0.01 and * p<0.05.
Table A.I: Physician Dispensing Regulations (2008–2010)
Dispensing Cantons Total
allowed Appenzell Innerrhoden, Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Basel-
Landschaft, Glarus, Lucerne, Obwalden, Nidwalden, St.
Gallen, Solothurn, Schwyz, Thurgau, Uri, Zug
13
banned Aargau1, Basel-Stadt, Fribourg1, Geneva2, Jura1,2,
Neuchatel2, Ticino2, Vaud2, Valais1
9
mixed Bern, Graubu¨nden, Schaffhausen, Zu¨rich 4
Notes : (1) drug dispensing banned with exception, (2) only French- or Italian-
speaking
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Table A.II: Additional Distribution Fees
ex-factory price (CHF) additional fee, additional fee (CHF), Retail price (CHF),
price dependent per package excl. VAT
0.05 - 4.99 12.0% 4.00 4.06 - 9.59
5.00 - 10.99 12.0% 8.00 13.60 - 20.31
11.00 - 14.99 12.0% 12.00 24.32 - 28.79
15.00 - 879.99 12.0% 16.00 32.80 - 1001.59
880.00 - 2569.99 7.0% 60.00 1001.60 - 2809.89
> 2570.00 0.0% 240.00 > 2810.00
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Table B.I: Variable Definitions and Construction
Variable Name Description/Construction Aggre-
gation
Source
direct drug costs a physician’s total real annual drug costs resulting from direct dispensing. Inflation-
adjusted to 2010 constant retail prices (Swiss francs) by using the appropriate sub-
indices from the Swiss CPI.
Sasis AG
indirect drug costs a physician’s total real annual drug costs resulting from issued prescriptions that are
filled in pharmacies. Inflation-adjusted to 2010 constant retail prices (Swiss francs)
by using the appropriate sub-indices from the Swiss CPI. Note: the excess markup of
pharmacies is adjusted for by the procedure explained in Section C.
Sasis AG
drug costs direct + indirect drug costs Sasis AG
nondrug costs a physician’s total annual non-drug medical expenditure. In constant 2010 Swiss
francs. Canton-specific price level differentials (TARMED) are adjusted for. Source:
http://www.praxishilfe.ch/seiten/tpw tarmed.html.
Sasis AG
cost share of drugs drug costs/(drug costs + non-drug costs) Sasis AG
drug costs per patient drug costs/# patients Sasis AG
nondrug costs per patient non-drug costs/# patients Sasis AG
share of dispensed drugs direct drug costs/drug costs Sasis AG
Continued on next page
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Table B.I – Continued from previous page
Variable Name Description/Construction Aggre-
gation
Source
dispensing status, Di =1, if physician is dispensing, =0 if physician is not dispensing. For physicians where
information is not available in MedReg (15%), we define the dispensing status based
on the policy rule prevailing in their office location.
MedReg,
Sasis AG
female =1 if physician is female, =0 if physician is male MedReg
German nationality =1 if physician has German nationality, =0 otherwise MedReg
other foreign nationality =1 if physician has foreign nationality other than German, =0 otherwise MedReg
age current year - year of graduation from medical school + 26, where 26 is the average
age at graduation
MedReg
work experience current year - year of attainment of specialty title MedReg
# patients the total number of patients who come to the physician’s office in the calendar year Sasis AG
# visits the total number of visits to the physician’s office in a calendar year Sasis AG
# visits per patient # visits/# patients Sasis AG
patients’ average age sum of patients’ age/# patients Sasis AG
cases aged > 80y # visits by patients aged above 80/# visits Sasis AG
cases aged 66− 80y # visits by patients aged btw. 66-80/# visits Sasis AG
cases aged < 25y # visits by patients aged below 25/# visits Sasis AG
cases of males # visits by male patients/# visits Sasis AG
Continued on next page
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Table B.I – Continued from previous page
Variable Name Description/Construction Aggre-
gation
Source
physician density The physician density is the total number of physicians per 1000 inhabitants in a
municipality.
1 MedReg,
SFSO
share with very good subj.
health
the share of the population who self-report very good health in the region. 2 SHS
share with good subj.
health
cf. previous 2 SHS
share with very good obj.
health
symptom-based measure. The share of the population in a region who have very good
objective health. Objective health is constructed by summing the following indicators:
pain in the back, adynamia, abdominal pain, looseness or costiveness, sleep disorder,
headache, heart palpitation or ventricular extrasystole, pain or pressure in the chest,
joint pain or pain in the limbs, and pain in the hands. Each variable can take the
values 0 (=no symptoms), 1 (=light symptoms) or 2 (=strong symptoms). The sum
of these variables is recoded as follows: 0-1 (=very good health), 2-3 (=good health),
4-6 (=fair health) and >6 (=poor health).
2 SHS
share with good obj.
health
cf. previous 2 SHS
Continued on next page
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Table B.I – Continued from previous page
Variable Name Description/Construction Aggre-
gation
Source
share with chronic health
problems
treatment-based measure. The share of the population in a region that was un-
der medical treatment due to at least one of the following chronic conditions: mi-
graine, asthma, diabetes, arthrosis, stomach ulcer, osteoporosis, chronic bronchitis,
high blood pressure, heart attack, apoplexy, renal disease, cancer, allergy, and depres-
sion.
2 SHS
share with high health risk diagnosis-based measure. The share of the population in a region diagnosed with high
blood pressure, high cholesterol level, and/or diabetes.
2 SHS
share of immigrants percentage of non-Swiss citizens in the permanent resident population of a munici-
pality
1 SFSO
fraction of urban area percentage of urbanized acreage relative to total acreage of a municipality 1 SFSO
net income per capita in
1000
average net income per-capita (2008) in 1,000 Swiss francs in municipality 1 SFFA,
SFSO
unemployment rate percentage of unemployed in total workforce in municipality 1 SFSO
share of medium educated percentage of vocational and secondary school graduates relative to total adult pop-
ulation in municipality
1 SFSO
share of high educated percentage of college and university graduates relative to total adult population in
municipality
1 SFSO
Continued on next page
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Table B.I – Continued from previous page
Variable Name Description/Construction Aggre-
gation
Source
population density log of population in 1000 per square kilometre in municipality 1 SFSO
share with managed-care
plan
percentage of the population enrolled in managed-care insurance plans (HMO and
others) in region
2 SHS
share with supplementary
insurance
percentage of the population with supplementary health care insurance in region 2 SHS
share with high deductible percentage of the population who choose a high deductible (>1000 Swiss francs) in
region
2 SHS
non-invasive specialist reference group. =1 if specialty includes dermatology, venereology, specialty for al-
lergies and immunology, endocrinology, pneumology, nephrology, neurology, hema-
tology, gastroenterology, oncology, physical medicine and rehabilitation, specialty for
infectious diseases, tropical medicine, metabolic pathology and neuropathology, =0
otherwise
Sasis AG
gynecologist =1 if gynecologist, =0 otherwise Sasis AG
angiologist =1 if angiologist, =0 otherwise Sasis AG
cardiologist =1 if cardiologist, =0 otherwise Sasis AG
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Table B.I – Continued from previous page
Variable Name Description/Construction Aggre-
gation
Source
invasive specialist =1 if specialty is surgery, pediatric surgery, ophthalmology, orthopaedy, vascular
surgery, urology, jaw and facial surgery, plastic surgery, or hand surgery, =0 oth-
erwise
Sasis AG
other type of specialist =1 if specialty is anesthetics, radiology, industrial medicine, pathology, pharmaceuti-
cal medicine, radio-oncology, intensive-care specialty, nuclear medicine, clinical phar-
macology and toxicology, genetics, or other non-classified specialty, =0 otherwise
Sasis AG
Aggregation 1: For each physician i, we compute a weighted average across municipalities. The share of visits at physician
i’s office due to people living in these municipalities is used as a weight.
Aggregation 2: For each physician i, we compute a weighted average across regions. The share of visits at physician i’s office
due to people living in these regions is used as a weight. Note: the SFSO divides Switzerland into 106 so-called mobility
regions.
Data Sources: Sasis AG: nationwide operator of the insurance claims database of Swiss health insurers, MedReg: federal
register of medical professionals, SFSO: Swiss Federal Statistical Office, SHS: Swiss Health Survey, SFFA: Swiss Federal
Finance Administration
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